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Global Warming Doom

So yeah that guy in 1989 was cra
He may very well have been crazy, but I'm not assessing your claim that his prediction was correct in regards to Syria based on whether he was sane or not. I'm assessing your claim by examining the available evidence.

In this case, since the Syrian conflict has been thoroughly studied, and there's no current compelling evidence that the drought was a factor at all, your claim has been debunked. If additional evidence is uncovered and it holds up to the rigor of independent review, I'd be more than willing to reevaluate your claim.

Do you have any other examples of coastal flooding and crop failure that have actually led to conflict?
 
Hmmm, I don't think that's what they actually said. Here's their own words for reference:

"In light of the above we can now return to our main questions: is there clear and reliable evidence that climate change-related drought in Syria was a contributory factor in the onset of the country's civil war?; and, if and where yes, was it as significant a contributory factor as is claimed in the existing academic and expert literature? On each step of the claimed causal chain, our answers are no. We find that there is no clear and reliable evidence that anthropogenic climate change was a factor in northeast Syria's 2006/07–2008/09 drought; we find that, while the 2006/07–2008/09 drought in northeast Syria will have contributed to migration, this migration was not on the scale claimed in the existing literature, and was, in all probability, more caused by economic liberalisation than drought; and we find that there is no clear and reliable evidence that drought-related migration was a contributory factor in civil war onset. In our assessment, there is thus no good evidence to conclude that global climate change-related drought in Syria was a contributory causal factor in the country's civil war."
Maybe it is I that should be teaching you. They acknowledge in the introduction that the drought contributing to the conflict is "essentially unfalsifiable." They also don't shut the door on it being a contributing causal factor, just assess the evidence to be lacking. That is the question of the extent of the drought contribution is still unanswered.
 
Maybe skip the childishness and get to the beef next time?
You opened yourself up for mocking in this thread with your assumption that you were correct without a doubt based on two articles that Google served up. We've done this routine at least a dozen times now. Maybe skip the smarminess next time and don't post a picture of war refugees as some kind of evidence that some guy's 1989 alarmist climate prediction is correct.
 
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You opened yourself up for mocking in this thread with your assumption that you were correct without a doubt based on two articles that Google served up. We've done this routine at least a dozen times now. Maybe skip the smarminess next time and don't post a picture of war refugees as some kind of evidence that some guy's 1989 alarmist climate prediction is correct.
If you think the picture is bad evidence just say so. There was no smarm (wrong usage BTW) until you brought ISIS into this.
 
no current compelling evidence that the drought was a factor at all, your claim has been debunked.
I dispute this. Your authors for some reason discount actual accounts from both sides of the conflict along with contemporaneous concerns from US state department personnel. Their bar for causal relationship is far too high and can't be met by any hypothesized structural cause of any conflict.
 
Maybe it is I that should be teaching you. They acknowledge in the introduction that the drought contributing to the conflict is "essentially unfalsifiable." They also don't shut the door on it being a contributing causal factor, just assess the evidence to be lacking. That is the question of the extent of the drought contribution is still unanswered.
Yeah, they don't actually acknowledge that the drought contributing to the conflict is "essentially unfalsifiable." Once again, let's go to their actual words.

"(4) that they were a contributory factor of unknown or unspecified significance."

"For the purposes of our analysis here, such slippages also make it difficult to know by what standard the Syria-climate conflict thesis should be evaluated. Any critique of claim types 1, 2 and 3 would be vulnerable to the counter that claim type 4, and therefore the entire Syria-climate conflict thesis, continues to hold. Yet conversely, it is impossible to demonstrate that climate change was not a factor at all in the onset of Syria's civil war, since claims of this type (claim type 4) are essentially unfalsifiable. Given this, instead of asking whether climate change was actually a causal factor, of whatever significance, in the Syrian civil war, our approach is to examine the quality of the evidence that has thus far been marshalled in support of this causal thesis. More specifically we ask: is there clear and reliable evidence that climate change-related drought in Syria was a contributory factor in the onset of the country's civil war?; and, if and where yes, was it as significant a contributory factor as is claimed in the existing academic and expert literature? We ask these questions in relation to both the overall Syria-climate conflict thesis, and each of its sub-theses. These questions place the burden of proof on the existing literature to demonstrate the existence of clear linkages between climate change, internal drought and Syria's civil war – rather than on us to undertake the impossible task of demonstrating their non-existence – whilst also leaving open the possibility that stronger evidence may at some point emerge."
 
There are like three or four papers publicly available on the matter.
Uhhhh, again, no. Maybe you should help yourself to the cited articles in each of the links I posted. It will be readily apparent that there are far more than like three or four papers publicly available on the matter.
 
I dispute this. Your authors for some reason discount actual accounts from both sides of the conflict along with contemporaneous concerns from US state department personnel. Their bar for causal relationship is far too high and can't be met by any hypothesized structural cause of any conflict.
No, they actually don't. A look at their methodology makes this statement wishful thinking at best.
 
Maybe it is I that should be teaching you. They acknowledge in the introduction that the drought contributing to the conflict is "essentially unfalsifiable." They also don't shut the door on it being a contributing causal factor, just assess the evidence to be lacking. That is the question of the extent of the drought contribution is still unanswered.
I'll expand on this with an example of what the authors are talking about.

"We're not sure of specific health problems or their significance, but this board contributes to the death of all of us as evidenced by our inevitable death."

Prove that wrong.
 
Yeah, they don't actually acknowledge that the drought contributing to the conflict is "essentially unfalsifiable." Once again, let's go to their actual words.

"(4) that they were a contributory factor of unknown or unspecified significance."

"For the purposes of our analysis here, such slippages also make it difficult to know by what standard the Syria-climate conflict thesis should be evaluated. Any critique of claim types 1, 2 and 3 would be vulnerable to the counter that claim type 4, and therefore the entire Syria-climate conflict thesis, continues to hold. Yet conversely, it is impossible to demonstrate that climate change was not a factor at all in the onset of Syria's civil war, since claims of this type (claim type 4) are essentially unfalsifiable. Given this, instead of asking whether climate change was actually a causal factor, of whatever significance, in the Syrian civil war, our approach is to examine the quality of the evidence that has thus far been marshalled in support of this causal thesis. More specifically we ask: is there clear and reliable evidence that climate change-related drought in Syria was a contributory factor in the onset of the country's civil war?; and, if and where yes, was it as significant a contributory factor as is claimed in the existing academic and expert literature? We ask these questions in relation to both the overall Syria-climate conflict thesis, and each of its sub-theses. These questions place the burden of proof on the existing literature to demonstrate the existence of clear linkages between climate change, internal drought and Syria's civil war – rather than on us to undertake the impossible task of demonstrating their non-existence – whilst also leaving open the possibility that stronger evidence may at some point emerge."
That's exactly what that says
 
Uhhhh, again, no. Maybe you should help yourself to the cited articles in each of the links I posted. It will be readily apparent that there are far more than like three or four papers publicly available on the matter.
On the subject of drought and the Syrian civil war?
 
I'll expand on this with an example of what the authors are talking about.

"We're not sure of specific health problems or their significance, but this board contributes to the death of all of us as evidenced by our inevitable death."

Prove that wrong.
Unfalsifiable.
 
No, they actually don't. A look at their methodology makes this statement wishful thinking at best.
Their methodology of ignoring the accounts of people involved in the conflict from both sides?
 
They are criticizing the way the conclusion is worded, not agreeing with it. See my example above.
They are criticizing the wording because it is so obviously true as to become banal and uninteresting
 
Their methodology of ignoring the accounts of people involved in the conflict from both sides?
They didn't ignore accounts of people involved in the conflict from both sides. Actually, they didn't ignore anything from any side.

Are you purposely ignoring their 109 cited references, their own refugee interviews, and the contributory work provided by all the folks listed in their acknowledgment?
 
They didn't ignore accounts of people involved in the conflict from both sides. Actually, they didn't ignore anything from any side.

Are you purposely ignoring their 109 cited references, their own refugee interviews, and the contributory work provided by all the folks listed in their acknowledgment?
No, but I'm also not the one claiming no evidence.
 
They are criticizing the wording because it is so obviously true as to become banal and uninteresting
You do realize that unfalsifiable statements don't belong in science, right? They are criticizing the use of unfalsifiable statements in a scholarly paper.
 
You can't say there is no evidence and turn around and list evidence.and then ignore that evidence in your conclusion
So, if I say that there's no evidence that 2+2 =5 after I've reviewed all the literature that claims 2+2=5 and the literature that says 2+2 =/= 5, I'm ignoring evidence by listing the sources I used that claimed 2+2=5?
 
53071337_2534636349893986_2851479227910324224_n.jpg
 
You do realize that unfalsifiable statements don't belong in science, right? They are criticizing the use of unfalsifiable statements in a scholarly paper.
It is falsifiable. H>0 leaves a lot of room for falsifying. They concede that the drought at the very least did not have a stabilizing effect when they say it is "essentially unfalsifiable." They are saying it H is obviously non negative.
Some similar proposition's that are quite falsifiable since the H can be negative.
The high proportion of women in regions of Syria contributed to the conflict.
Ethnic homogenity in Syria contributed to the conflict.
The high proportion of senior citizens in regions of Syria contributed to the conflict.
Cyanide increases life expectancy.
 
So, if I say that there's no evidence that 2+2 =5 after I've reviewed all the literature that claims 2+2=5 and the literature that says 2+2 =/= 5, I'm ignoring evidence by listing the sources I used that claimed 2+2=5?
"In evaluating this sub-thesis, it is worth acknowledging from the outset that there is abundant evidence that Syria's 2006/07–2008/09 drought did have some significant agricultural, rural livelihood and migration effects, especially within the governorate of Hasakah."


"What, lastly, of testimony from individual Syrians? ‘The drought and unemployment were important in pushing people towards revolution’, says a Syrian farmer quoted by Kelley et al. (2015: p. 3245, following Friedman, 2013); ‘the drought was beyond our capacity as a country to deal with’, claimed the Syrian Minister of Agriculture as quoted by Gleick (2014: p. 334, from US Embassy Damascus, 2008b). "

No evidence
 
"In evaluating this sub-thesis, it is worth acknowledging from the outset that there is abundant evidence that Syria's 2006/07–2008/09 drought did have some significant agricultural, rural livelihood and migration effects, especially within the governorate of Hasakah."


"What, lastly, of testimony from individual Syrians? ‘The drought and unemployment were important in pushing people towards revolution’, says a Syrian farmer quoted by Kelley et al. (2015: p. 3245, following Friedman, 2013); ‘the drought was beyond our capacity as a country to deal with’, claimed the Syrian Minister of Agriculture as quoted by Gleick (2014: p. 334, from US Embassy Damascus, 2008b). "

No evidence

"says a Syrian farmer." Quality job here.
 
"In evaluating this sub-thesis, it is worth acknowledging from the outset that there is abundant evidence that Syria's 2006/07–2008/09 drought did have some significant agricultural, rural livelihood and migration effects, especially within the governorate of Hasakah."
You forgot to include their actual analysis (which is too long to repost here) and conclusion...

"Overall we conclude that, while there is no reason to doubt that the 2006/07–2008/09 drought did increase migration from northeast Syria during 2008–09, FGK significantly overstate both the scale of the migration, and the extent to which it was caused by drought. The official UN and Syrian government estimate was that 40–60,000 families migrated from northeast Syria during 2008–09, not the 1.5 or 2 million people that is often claimed. Moreover, given that large-scale migration from northeast Syria predated the drought, it follows that ‘excess migration’ (i.e. migration during 2008–09 minus average pre-drought migration numbers) must have been lower still. Numbers aside, we also find that FGK present a mistakenly environment- and drought-centric reading of the causes of northeast Syria's agrarian and migration crisis, and that other factors, most importantly Syria's experiment with economic liberalisation, were likely more important contexts for and catalysts of migration than the drought."

"What, lastly, of testimony from individual Syrians? ‘The drought and unemployment were important in pushing people towards revolution’, says a Syrian farmer quoted by Kelley et al. (2015: p. 3245, following Friedman, 2013); ‘the drought was beyond our capacity as a country to deal with’, claimed the Syrian Minister of Agriculture as quoted by Gleick (2014: p. 334, from US Embassy Damascus, 2008b). "
And then the rest that you left out, which includes the actual analysis of the data...

"Clearly, such comments should not be dismissed as irrelevant, since subjective representations and reasoning are critical elements in the descent into war, as in any political process. That said, it is striking how little personal testimony is marshalled in support of the claim that drought-related migration was a factor in the Syrian uprising: Kelley et al. quote just one displaced Syrian farmer, Gleick and Femia and Werrell none at all...

In summary, the evidence marshalled by FGK and others in support of drought migration-civil war thesis is extremely weak: neither their assertions about population pressures, nor their claims about the chronology and geography of Syria's early unrest, nor indeed the testimonies they quote, provide any firm basis for concluding that migration from northeast Syria was a factor in civil war onset. To the contrary, our evidence suggests that migrants from the northeast were not significantly involved in the early 2011 unrest."
 
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You forgot to include their actual analysis (which is too long to repost here) and conclusion...

"Overall we conclude that, while there is no reason to doubt that the 2006/07–2008/09 drought did increase migration from northeast Syria during 2008–09, FGK significantly overstate both the scale of the migration, and the extent to which it was caused by drought. The official UN and Syrian government estimate was that 40–60,000 families migrated from northeast Syria during 2008–09, not the 1.5 or 2 million people that is often claimed. Moreover, given that large-scale migration from northeast Syria predated the drought, it follows that ‘excess migration’ (i.e. migration during 2008–09 minus average pre-drought migration numbers) must have been lower still. Numbers aside, we also find that FGK present a mistakenly environment- and drought-centric reading of the causes of northeast Syria's agrarian and migration crisis, and that other factors, most importantly Syria's experiment with economic liberalisation, were likely more important contexts for and catalysts of migration than the drought."


And then the rest that you left out, which includes the actual analysis of the data...

"Clearly, such comments should not be dismissed as irrelevant, since subjective representations and reasoning are critical elements in the descent into war, as in any political process. That said, it is striking how little personal testimony is marshalled in support of the claim that drought-related migration was a factor in the Syrian uprising: Kelley et al. quote just one displaced Syrian farmer, Gleick and Femia and Werrell none at all...

In summary, the evidence marshalled by FGK and others in support of drought migration-civil war thesis is extremely weak: neither their assertions about population pressures, nor their claims about the chronology and geography of Syria's early unrest, nor indeed the testimonies they quote, provide any firm basis for concluding that migration from northeast Syria was a factor in civil war onset. To the contrary, our evidence suggests that migrants from the northeast were not significantly involved in the early 2011 unrest."
1. Acknowledge evidence
2. Hand wave
3. No evidence
 
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