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Germanwings Airbus crash

Russ is right
The pilot likely was punching in the code and the co pilot was overriding it. Let's not forget that the pilot was screaming at the co pilot and getting no answer. I think the character assassination is well deserved and accurate.
 
Even if the co-pilots hands were full, he could have at least communicated that there was a problem.

To keep the captain locked out he had to keep hitting the over-ride switch to prevent him from accessing the cockpit with the keyboard code. From what I've seen, one has to hit the override about every 30-45 seconds to prevent access.

If from the cockpit recordings you can hear the captain screaming to let him in and can hear him trying to axe through the door, one would presume that any reasonable person on the other side of the door who was doing his best to keep the plane from descending and struggling with the controls would have at least yelled back to the pilot about what was going on. But according to the reports, all they recording from him was his breathing.

It would take Alex Jones levels of insanity, under these circumstances (and based on what the prosecutors know from the black boxes that they have released publicly) to come away with any conclusion other than this was a deliberate act by the co-pilot.

It's not the first time, and I'm fairly certain this is what happened to the Air Malaysia flight that went missing last year as well.
 
I have heard quite a few CVR transcripts, at least the ones that have been released to the public, being able to hear breathing isn't something I have ever been able to pick up, but I am guessing the newer microphones in use must be a lot more sensitive. Most of the CVR transcripts that are out there are older. Either that, or the copilot was breathing heavily in anticipation for the crash.

I have read in some places that the lockout is for 5 min after the button is depressed to override the cockpit code entry. In this instance, it would have been a one time button push.

Somewhere it was mentioned that the copilot reset the descent level to 96 feet, the lowest possible setting on the aircraft, after the captain left the cockpit. Not sure how they know that without the flight data recorder as evidence. I haven't read as to whether or not they have found it yet, I understood that they had found the casing for it, but the memory card was still missing. Unless that is a bit of telemetry transmitted back to the tower, I am just not sure how they can be certain of that fact.

One things for sure, it's highly doubtful that the copilot could lose consciousness, push the stick forward (pretty sure the Airbus is a stick and not a control column), disengage, the autopilot, and override the cockpit door. Unless there's an electrical issue that occurred and all those systems are tied into the same bit of wiring...and the copilot froze in horror while trying to work the problem and didn't respond to verbal stimuli.

They really need the FDR. That will definitely lay out the last bits of control input and systems manipulation.
 
not sure exactly of how they were able to determine the copilot intentionally set the new altitude but maybe from the other box they found that was complete. He must have also adjusted the decent rate for the autopilot to couple up with his inputs. I think they pretty much know that everything that happened to control the aircraft came from him or his inputs to the equipment and it was intentionally done. I was wondering how many flights these 2 were together on and how the copilot knew that the pilot was going to jump out of the cockpit at just the right time for him to do all this. Was it a pre-planned deal or something that was spontaneous? Maybe they had been on flights together before and this was something typical of the pilot to do...get out of the cockpit at cruise altitude and flirt with the stewardesses.
 
The other box would just be the CVR, the cockpit voice recorder. It won't contain anything other than the conversations in the cockpit, and in this case, the screaming from the passenger cabin. Again, these must be much better microphones now, most CVR recordings I have heard that have been released only contain the conversations and sounds inside the cockpit.

The most famous of these is the Flying Tiger transcript from 1989. It's used in training and is one of the first ones you will find on YouTube if you google CVR recordings. In that one, you can hear the pilot and copilot get confused on the glideslope trajectory into Kuala Lampur (maylaysia...go figure) in dense fog and instead of hearing "descend to 2400 feet", they think the tower said "descend to 400 feet", which ends with the copilot saying "Sh*t" and then the impact of the 747 cargo plane hitting the side of a mountain.

I had to add, I know the CVR can be used to hear audible control clicks and audible warning indications, not sure if when setting the descent limits of there's an automated voice calling out the settings or not, but that would be about the only way they would know the pilot would have changed the settings by CVR analysis alone.

This post was edited on 3/28 12:45 PM by Rulz
 
A good dose of narcissism can go a long way. It probably didn't show up as too big a problem on psychological tests because some "cockiness" is not unusual in professional pilots.

But add that to depression, which is most likely the "medical problem" he was hiding, and the combination obviouslycan be lethal.
 
Yes, I believe it was DeepFork. Not for sure on that, but I swear he mentioned about being on a plane that crashed in Dallas.

Can't remember the details or what flight he was talking about though.
 
That's what I was thinking. It crashed on takeoff Bc the pilots were talking about banging some flight attendant.

This is why I like have male flight attendants.
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Originally posted by latimdj:
Very interesting here is that there is an emergency entry code. I wonder if the "alpha protection mode" has any affect on the emergency entry code. Why could the pilot not use the emergency entry code?
The alpha protections, along with other integrated flight control protections, in the modern Airbus aircraft are preset flight envelope protections that are there to try and assist the pilots in keeping the aircraft in the proper attitudes throughout the flight.

Airbus has limits in the software that while the crew is operating in Normal Law (everything running as it should), there are protections that keep the aircraft from getting into high speed, high bank angles, excessive pitch attitudes, etc. When a pilot tries to hold the sidestick back with the thrust levers at idle, the computers will sense in impending stall and automatically attempt to correct the situation by lowering the nose and/or advancing the thrust. Similarly if a pilot is trying a bank angle that exceeds 67 degrees, that aircraft will not allow it to go beyond that.

So, to answer the initial question, the door isn't linked in any way to any of the flight mgmt computer's protections.
 
Here is a little more research for your consumption ... I am not ready to throw the co-pilot under the bus just yet..... I think the "Paris Prosecutor" who is releasing ALL the information, may be a little biased in Airbus' favor..... but I could be wrong.... Appears to me that the Airbus A320 family may have a problem with iced over Angle of Attack sensors which can cause what I was mentioning earlier to be enabled (alpha protection mode) as I understand it...... If the angle of attack sensor is iced over and sending bad information to the Autopilot, could be bad..... Again, I am not claiming to be a pilot or air traffic controller or anything.....just reading up on this..... I have seen that there have been at least a few documented cases where the AOA sensor was iced over. In 2010, caused a luftansa / Air New Zealand hand over flight to crash in the Mediterrean Sean. 2014, caused a rapid decent in a Luftansa flight that did not end up in a crash as I understand it, but was very close to being catastrophic.

Just trying to get those interested to keep an open mind..... Hell I could be wrong....wouldn't be the first time.... or the last....

Pilot's message board
 
Here is another which includes this quote "The EASA warned that in such a situation 'the flight control laws order a continuous nose down pitch rate that, in a worst case scenario, cannot be stopped with backward sidestick inputs, even in the full backward position.'"




dailymail in UK
 
Originally posted by latimdj:
caused a rapid decent in a Luftansa flight that did not end up in a crash as I understand it, but was very close to being catastrophic.

Just trying to get those interested to keep an open mind..... Hell I could be wrong....wouldn't be the first time.... or the last....
I know you're trying to be informed, etc, but the Lufthansa flight you mention DID level out at 27,000'. Not quite close to catastrophic. Absolutely scary for the passengers and crew, but they did as they were trained to do and took the necessary steps to arrest the descent and continued.

I'm not an Airbus apologist, nor a Boeing-or-I'm-not-going person, but having spent years learning aircraft systems on multiple types from both manufacturers, both companies have had issues with different systems that required Airworthiness Directives to be issued. Both companies have at times relied too heavily on automation. Airbus has probably done more with automation than Boeing at an earlier stage as they were introducing fly-by-wire in the early 80s. Now Boeing's 787 are almost just as computer-reliant as the 'buses.

The AOA sensors that Airbus has been using absolutely have to be fixed, no doubt about it. Like anything else in the aviation world, as these things (repairs) aren't typically instant, the AD gives the fix / workaround until a permanent solution can be done. This particular AD has the crew turn off two air data computers, that's it. Continued flight in Alternate Law (when the two ADCs are off) isn't a big deal. It's something that all 'bus pilots are trained extensively on. They still have everything they would need to safely operate and land.

There's very little doubt in my mind that the FO was the root cause of this particular accident. Let's say for a minute that the AOA sensors froze up. This flight was at level cruise altitude and speed (based on some reports, since the DFDR data hasn't been released to my knowledge). The alpha prot wouldn't have tried to lower the nose as the speed was not increasing. Plus, at no time did the FO yell or say anything to the Capt to let him know that something was wrong. Even if the FO was so occupied at the situation that he couldn't unlock the door for the Capt, he could have said something, but he didn't. Maintained normal breathing.

Latimdj, my intention isn't to knock what you're saying, just trying to offer some additional information from this side of the industry.
 
Interesting SKC.

I have always wondered what pilots thought about going from a control column to a little joystick to the side. To me, as a non-pilot, and I won't pretend to act like I know more than what I have read or seen on different media....it seems it would be unnerving to go from a rather large control unit to something small like that when piloting a large aircraft. I will assume there's some feedback through the stick, but I would think the control column being large and requiring two hands would feel more reassuring at least in the feel of what the aircraft is encountering in certain situations. If an automobile ,for example, were to move from a steering wheel to some sort of joystick (I think of the setup used in the taxi cabs in "Total Recall" with Arnold Schwarzenegger lol), I would feel somewhat "naked".

Anyway, that was a bit of a tangent in this discussion, when I watched the show about the Quantas pilots who were dealing with a large number of error messages in flight (Quantas flight 32, from 2006, an Airbus 320), they had a computer screen in front of them and a control stick, just seemed insane given the sheer size of that aircraft.
 
Full disclosure, although I am close to completion of my private pilot certificate, I'm not a professional pilot. I've been a dispatcher for 19 years where we're required to learn the systems of the aircraft we were dispatching. While I know quite a bit about systems, I'm not to the level of proficiency of a line pilot.

Aircraft that are fly-by-wire many times will offer an artificial feel / response to the pilot. In the old days the pilot could feel / sense the actual wind resistance on the ailerons / rudder / elevator via the control column because they were linked by cables. Now they are just linked via electronic wire, so it's an artificial feel (even in Boeing's 777 and 787 that still have control columns). I don't recall Airbus offering an artificial feel / sensing in their sidesticks. They are spring loaded to neutral, so there's some resistance the further you move it further away from neutral, but nothing artificial.
 
SKC,

no offense taken.... I just find the conversation kind of fascinating.....A couple of things:

1.) Was told by my boss (small plane pilot), that the Luftansa flight that dropped 12K feet or what ever, the reason they were able to recover was they restarted the flight computers somehow upon advice from Airbus Tech support via cell phone call by the Co Pilot during the situation. Quick thinking saved their lives.... You say it's not a big deal to turn these computers off, but and pilots are trained extensively on it, but why then have their been 4-5 crashes where this is the root cause, or suspected root cause

2.) I think you might be mistaken in your statement that the alpha prot wouldn't have tried to lower the nose. This is exactly the situation the AD describes. It says that you may not be able to recover even by pulling all the way back on the stick.... If a froze sensor is feeding bad information to the computers, I could see the alpha prot doing the wrong thing....

3.) My understanding from my boss today is that the french prosecutor said that the Co Pilot had activated his Oxygen Mask. This would explain why there was nothing from him on the CVR.

I am not saying that I am totally convinced that the Co-Pilot is blameless. I just don't think he was trying to commit suicide like the media would have us believe. I think the French Prosecutor is suspicious in that so far he is the only source of information. If you are suicidal and you are a pilot and want to kill yourself, why wouldn't you wait till the pilot leaves and just drive the plane into the ground. The plane went into a descent, but the rate of descent was slowing, which is a possible indication that the Co pilot was pulling back on the stick and making some progress. When the plane went nose down, the speed of the plane originally picked up, but then over time it slowed down. Again, indicating that the Co-pilot was trying to pull it out of a dive.

It's my understanding that the Co-Pilot had relatively few hours of flight time in this model. I just think he was fighting the plane as best he could, and he didn't want to let go of the stick to let the pilot in, because he could see progress. Could the pilot have helped him....probably.....Was the pilot better trained on how to deal with a possibly frozen AOA sensor....more than likely.... Could the pilot have saved the plane, who knows...... I just think there is too many things that don't add up in this one to think that this is a simple open and shut case of the Co-pilot being depressed and committing suicide..... the Company line doesn't make sense..... Not saying the Co Pilot is totally blameless.... Sure sounds like to me that Airbus has some HUGE culpability here, even if the Co-pilot did not act correctly.
 
We I guess given the black box finding of yesterday, doesn't help my conspiracy theory...... I guess I don't understand why one of the website's I cited earlier in this thread would print information that indicated that the airplane was slowing down, when it appears that the black box information says it was speeding up.....
 
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