Originally posted by 07pilt:
Originally posted by Ostatedchi:
With the right font it could be 8 pages, I guess. Maybe 8 pages of microfiche?
It is actually 7 pages of rules. Appendix A is the only part of the document that is an actual regulation.
So then this, from pages 61-64, for example, is unnecessary to understand what the FCC intends?:
a. Factors to Guide Application of the Rule
138. We adopt our tentative conclusion to follow a case-by-case approach, considering the
totality of the circumstances, when analyzing whether conduct satisfies the no-unreasonable
interference/disadvantage standard to protect the open Internet.329 Below we discuss a non-exhaustive list
of factors we will use to assess such practices. In adopting this standard, we enable flexibility in business
arrangements and ensure that innovation in broadband and edge provider business models is not unduly
curtailed.330 We are mindful that vague or unclear regulatory requirements could stymie rather than
encourage innovation,331 and find that this approach combined with the factors set out below will provide
sufficient certainty and guidance to consumers, broadband providers, and edge providers-particularly
smaller entities that might lack experience dealing with broadband providers-while also allowing parties
flexibility in developing new services.332 We note that in addition to the following list, there may be
other considerations relevant to determining whether a particular practice violates the no-unreasonable
interference/disadvantage standard. This approach of adopting a rule of general conduct, followed by
guidance as to how to apply it on a case-by-case basis, is not novel. The Commission took a similar
approach in 2010 when it adopted the "no unreasonable discrimination" rule, which was followed by a
discussion of four factors (end-user control, use-agnostic discrimination, standard practices, and
transparency).333 Indeed, for this new rule, we are providing at least as much guidance, if not more, as we
did in 2010 for the application of the no unreasonable discrimination rule.
139.
End-User Control. A practice that allows end-user control and is consistent with
promoting consumer choice is less likely to unreasonably interfere with or cause an unreasonable
disadvantage affecting the end user's ability to use the Internet as he or she sees fit.334 The Commission
has long recognized that enabling consumer choice is the best path toward ensuring competitive markets,
economic growth, and technical innovation.335 It is therefore critical that consumers' decisions, rather
329
2014 Open Internet NPRM, 29 FCC Rcd at 5608, para. 136; CDT and ALA Reply at 2.
330 This is in contrast to the inflexibility that the
Verizon court found was a flaw in the 2010 unreasonable
discrimination standard.
See supra note 96. We also note that this approach addresses concerns in the record that
"[a] 'general conduct rule,' applied on a case-by-case basis with the only touchstone being whether a given practice
'harms' consumers or edge providers, may lead to years of expensive litigation to determine the meaning of 'harm'
(for those who can afford to engage in it)." Letter from Corynne McSherry, Intellectual Property Director, EFF, to
Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 14-28, at 1 (filed Feb. 19, 2015) (EFF Feb. 19, 2015
Ex Parte
Letter). Understanding that such an unfocused approach could harm the results of our rule, we "spell out, in
advance, the contours and limits of [the] rule," as was suggested in the record.
See, e.g.,
id.
331
See, e.g., Akamai Comments at 10; CALinnovates Reply at 19 (stating that "regulatory clarity may significantly
affect the calculus of current and potential investors"); Higher Education and Libraries Reply at 11-14 (asserting that
a clearly articulated standard focused on preserving the existing Internet would set expectations and provide
guidance to the market, but would avoid hard and fast rules that might be too rigid for a rapidly changing broadband
ecosystem); CDT and ALA Reply at 2.
332 CDT and ALA Reply at 2. We also note that this Order permits parties to seek advisory opinions regarding
application of the Commission's open Internet rules. We view these processes as complementary methods by which
parties can seek guidance as to how the open Internet rules apply to particular conduct.
See infra Section III.E.
333
2010 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17944-46, paras. 68-74.
334
Id. at 17944, para. 71;
see also EFF Feb. 19, 2015
Ex Parte Letter at 2 (suggesting that the Commission should
take into consideration "whether the practice preserves user choice").
335
See supra Section III.A;
see also, e.g., Verizon Comments at 16-17; Syntonic Reply at 5-6; van Schewick Feb.
18, 2015
Ex Parte Letter, Attach. at 14 ("Letting users, not network providers, choose which applications will be
successful is an important part of the mechanism that produces innovation under uncertainty. At the same time,
letting users choose how they want to use the network enables them to use the Internet in a way that creates more
value for them (and for society) than if network providers made this choice for them.").
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than those of service providers, remain the driving force behind the development of the Internet.336 To
this end, practices that favor end-user control and empower meaningful consumer choice are more likely
to satisfy the no-unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard than those that do not. However, as was
true in 2010, we are cognizant that user control and network control are not mutually exclusive, and that
many practices will fall somewhere on a spectrum from more end-user-controlled to more broadband
provider-controlled.337 Further, there may be practices controlled entirely by broadband providers that
nonetheless satisfy the no-unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard. In all events, however, we
emphasize that such practices should be fully transparent to the end user and effectively reflect end users'
choices.
140.
Competitive Effects. As the Commission has found previously, broadband providers have
incentives to interfere with and disadvantage the operation of third-party Internet-based services that
compete with the providers' own services.338 Practices that have anti-competitive effects in the market for
applications, services, content, or devices would likely unreasonably interfere with or unreasonably
disadvantage edge providers' ability to reach consumers in ways that would have a dampening effect on
innovation, interrupting the virtuous cycle. As such, these anticompetitive practices are likely to harm
consumers' and edge providers' ability to use broadband Internet access service to reach one another.
Conversely, enhanced competition leads to greater options for consumers in services, applications,
content, and devices, and as such, practices that would enhance competition would weigh in favor of
promoting consumers' and edge providers' ability to use broadband Internet access service to reach one
another.339 In examining the effect on competition of a given practice, we will also review the extent of
an entity's vertical integration as well as its relationships with affiliated entities.
141.
Consumer Protection. The no-unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard is
intended to serve as a strong consumer protection standard. It prohibits broadband providers from
employing any deceptive or unfair practice that will unreasonably interfere with or disadvantage end-user
consumers' ability to select, access, or use broadband services, applications, or content, so long as the
services are lawful, subject to the exception for reasonable network management. For example, unfair or
deceptive billing practices, as well as practices that fail to protect the confidentiality of end users'
proprietary information, will be unlawful if they unreasonably interfere with or disadvantage end-user
consumers' ability to select, access, or use broadband services, applications, or content, so long as the
services are lawful, subject to the exception for reasonable network management. While each individual
case will be evaluated on its own merits, this rule is intended to include protection against fraudulent
practices such as "cramming" and "slamming" that have long been viewed as unfair and disadvantageous
to consumers.
336
See Netflix Comments at 5 ("Through an open Internet, the consumer, not the ISP or the edge provider, picks the
winners and the losers."); Vonage Comments at 13 ("Allowing ISPs to select winners and losers will certainly chill
investment and innovation in startups because they will lack the ability to develop a following among users without
getting past the ISP gatekeeper."); AT&T Comments at 27-30 (distinguishing beneficial user-directed prioritization
agreements from harmful paid-prioritization agreements initiated by service providers); Ad Hoc Comments at 22-23.
Notably, under section 230(b) of the Communications Act, increased user control is an express objective of modern
telecommunications policy. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3) (directing policymakers "to encourage the development of
technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by individuals . . . who use the Internet
and other interactive computer services").
337
2010 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17944-45, para 71.
338
See supra Section III.B.2.a;
2010 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17916, para. 22. The Commission
adopted a similar restriction to address harms raised by the Comcast-NBCU transaction.
See Comcast/NBCU
Merger Order, 26 FCC Rcd at 4275, para. 94 ("[N]either Comcast nor Comcast-NBCU shall prioritize affiliated
Internet content over unaffiliated Internet content.").
339
See, e.g., Verizon Comments at 35; Free State Reply at 3 ("The welfare of consumers should be the focus and
deciding criterion for Commission broadband policy."); Free State Reply at 12.
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142.
Effect on Innovation, Investment, or Broadband Deployment. As the
Verizon court
recognized, Internet openness drives a "virtuous cycle" in which innovations at the edges of the network
enhance consumer demand, leading to expanded investments in broadband infrastructure that, in turn,
spark new innovations at the edge.340 As such, practices that stifle innovation, investment, or broadband
deployment would likely unreasonably interfere with or unreasonably disadvantage end users' or edge
providers' use of the Internet under the legal standard we set forth today.341
143.
Free Expression. As Congress has recognized, the Internet "offer
a forum for a true
diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for
intellectual activity."342 Practices that threaten the use of the Internet as a platform for free expression
would likely unreasonably interfere with or unreasonably disadvantage consumers' and edge providers'
ability to use BIAS to communicate with each other, thereby causing harm to that ability. Further, such
practices would dampen consumer demand for broadband services, disrupting the virtuous cycle, and
harming end user and edge provider use of the Internet under the legal standard we set forth today.343
144. Application Agnostic. Application-agnostic (sometimes referred to as use-agnostic)
practices likely do not cause an unreasonable interference or an unreasonable disadvantage to end users'
or edge providers' ability to use BIAS to communicate with each other.344 Application-agnostic practices
do not interfere with end users' choices about which content, applications, services, or devices to use, nor
340 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 659.
341 See, e.g., EFF Feb. 19, 2015 Ex Parte Letter at 2 (suggesting that the Commission should take into consideration
"whether and how the practice impacts the cost of
innovation"); Letter from Vimeo, LLC, et al. to Marlene H.
Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 14-28 (filed Feb. 19, 2014) (asking that the general conduct rule take into
consideration whether a challenged practice "keeps application development and innovation costs low"); see also
Akamai Reply at 2 ("Innovative traffic platforms and networks have thus been key in facilitating the virtuous circle
through which increased broadband Internet usage drives increased investment by service and content providers,
which in turn drives further usage."); Nokia Reply at 5 ("It is important that the Commission recognize that
operators and infrastructure providers are a critical element of this virtuous cycle of innovation."); Nokia Reply at 8
("Value creation in all segments of the broadband marketplace is a critical component of maintaining the level of
innovation seen in the last decade.").
342 47 U.S.C.§ 230(a)(3); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997) ("No single organization controls any
membership in the Web, nor is there any single centralized point from which individual Web sites or services can be
blocked from the Web.") (internal citation omitted).
343 See, e.g., AAJC Comments at 2; ACLU Comments at 2 ("As information technology advances apace, the
meaningful exercise of our constitutional rights-ncluding the freedoms of speech, assembly, press and the right to
petition government-as become literally dependent on broadband Internet access."); American Public Media
Group Comments at 3; CDT Comments at 5; OTI Comments at 3; see also EFF Feb. 19, 2015 Ex Parte Letter at 2
(suggesting that the Commission should take into consideration "whether and how the practice impacts the cost of
free speech"). We also note that the no-unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard does not unconstitutionally
burden any of the First Amendment rights held by broadband providers because broadband providers are conduits,
not speakers, with respect to broadband Internet access services. See infra Section VI.A.
344 A network practice is application-agnostic if it does not differentiate in treatment of traffic, or if it differentiates
in treatment of traffic without reference to the content, application, or device. A practice is application-specific if it
is not application-agnostic. Application-specific network practices include, for example, those applied to traffic that
has a particular source or destination, that is generated by a particular application or by an application that belongs
to a particular class of applications, that uses a particular application- or transport- layer protocol, or that has
particular characteristics (e.g., the size, sequencing, and/or timing of packets). See 2010 Open Internet Order, 25
FCC Rcd at 17938, para. 56 (application-specific); id. at 17945, para. 73 (application-agnostic); BITAG Congestion
Report at 19 (discussing which traffic is subject to congestion management); see also, e.g., van Schewick Sept. 19,
2014 Ex Parte Letter, Attach. at 24; Mozilla Reply at 22; i2 Coalition Comments at 43; OTI Comments at iv. We
note, however, that there do exist circumstances where application-agnostic practices raise competitive concerns,
and as such may violate our standard to protect the open Internet. See infra para. 153.
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do they distort competition and unreasonably disadvantage certain edge providers.345 As such, they likely
would not cause harm by unreasonably interfering with or disadvantaging end users or edge providers'
ability to communicate using BIAS.
145. Standard Practices. In evaluating whether a practice violates our no-unreasonable
interference/disadvantage standard to protect Internet openness, we will consider whether a practice
conforms to best practices and technical standards adopted by open, broadly representative, and
independent Internet engineering, governance initiatives, or standards-setting organization.346
Consideration of input from technical advisory groups accounts for the important role these organizations
have to play in developing communications policy.347 We make clear, however, that we are not
delegating authority to interpret or implement our rules to outside bodies.