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Military bases in the Middle East?

HighStickHarry

MegaPoke is insane
Gold Member
Apr 21, 2006
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What happens after an area is cleared and you don't stay hold it? We've yet to learn this lesson in multiple wars.

These people can't protect themselves from extremists. It's like fighting cockroaches with a hammer.
 
Arm chair Military strategists have no opinion on this?

One person's opinion on this very subject, I read it just yesterday:

February 22, 2017
How to Win Wars
By Chet Richards

Viet Nam: a war won on the battlefield but lost in Congress. Viet Nam is a melancholy episode in a long string of modern strategic failures that continue to plague us. Something is wrong with our current thinking about war.

It has become fashionable in academic circles to talk about "counterfactual history." This is just a fancy way of formalizing the alternate history theme of a great many science fiction stories. It is basically a what-if speculation on what the world would be like if a particular historical event had turned out differently. For example, what if Stonewall Jackson had not been killed, with Lee therefore winning at Gettysburg?

Of course, history is as it is. One cannot know what an alternate history really might have been like.

Actually, that is not quite the case. We do have real counterfactual demonstrations of historical outcomes. The recent history of the United States provides such examples.

Consider the following seven wars: Germany, Japan, Korea, Viet Nam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya. Three long-term successes and four failures. Seven counterfactual experiments with two diametrically opposite outcomes.

These experimental demonstrations do not seem to fit Colin Powell's Doctrine for War Decision:

  1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?
  2. Do we have a clear attainable objective?
  3. Have the risks and cost been fully and frankly analyzed?
  4. Have all other nonviolent policy means been fully exhausted?
  5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
  6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
  7. Is the action supported by the American people?
  8. Do we have genuine broad international support?
Of course, Colin Powell's record of wisdom is not perfect. He talked President George H.W. Bush into suspending the First Gulf War after a symbolic one hundred hours. No war symbolism, please! Finish the job. Many recognized that this premature suspension of combat would inevitably lead to a second Gulf war. And so it transpired.

Nevertheless, three of Powell's dictums are obviously correct. These are the first, second, and seventh. The rest provide useless, or even flat wrong, advice.

The essential three points involve long-term national survival and not something we have much to say about. The Second World War and the Korean War were forced upon us. We had no choice in the matter. These were defensive wars. Two of them involved immediate national survival. The Korean war was a serious threat to the long-term survival of America. Our objective in these wars was simply the permanent defeat of the enemy. In these wars, the objective was obvious to Americans right from the start. Any cost necessary to achieve total victory would be borne.

The Korean War required presidential leadership to explain the war's significance and long-term objective: stop Communist aggression. Americans accepted the reason but required the war to be won as expeditiously as possible.

Counterfactually, we have two radically different outcomes of these various wars. Some of the wars produced permanent victory; other wars produced defeat and chaos. Why the difference? In three cases, we stayed after the fighting was done. We still have military forces in Germany, Japan, and South Korea. In the other four cases, we immediately left (or are leaving) the arena after the full combat victory. The result has been instability and the resumption of conflict even before our withdrawal.

We stayed after the fighting was done. Why does this make the difference? Any nation that has been a battleground is in a state of chaos. Its native civil institutions have failed or been obliterated. Leadership is lacking. Crime is rampant. Trust is broken. There is widespread physical destruction, with ordinary civil services badly disrupted. The situation is a mess.

Furthermore, declaring an exit date, as we did in Iraq and Afghanistan, is a declaration that we have lost the war. Our enemy needs only to wait us out to win.

In order for the society to re-establish itself, a scaffolding of security and stability is required. That requires us. We stay, however long it takes, until the new society can stand, securely, on its own. Powell is wrong. There must not be an exit strategy. Our entanglement must be endless. In the course of time, the battleground nation matures and becomes strong, and our entanglement changes its nature from a supporting and protective scaffold to friendship and alliance, as it has in Japan, Germany, and Korea.

Is this colonialism? Call it what you like. In reality, it is simple pragmatism and wisdom. Our constitutional philosophy has little room for real colonialism. Nonetheless, we must look after the survival and prosperity interests of the United States first and last and always. If this means foreign occupation for an extended time, so be it. Occupation is not something we like to do. Historically, we have not engaged in forced occupation for long periods. The Filipinos are free. Cuba has long had its independence. Various other Central American countries we once occupied are independent. Japan, Germany, and South Korea are allies where we are invited guests for mutual defense.

What about Powell's other points? Eliminate the first and eighth points, and the remainder smack of preparation for a war of aggression. They could have guided Germany's or Japan's war plan in the 1930s. God forbid!

There are key messages that we take from this.

First, go to war only when the national security is clearly threatened. War should be a response only to foreign aggression that threatens our survival or our key national interests.

Second, win decisively and as quickly as possible. Victory means the enemy no longer exists. As a corollary to swift victory, accept that there will be innocent casualties. Minimize these, but make sure everyone understands that the aggressor enemy has the real responsibility for any civilian casualties.

Third, make sure the American people fully understand, and continue to understand, why we fight, and why their sacrifice in this war is essential. Leadership is the key to success.

Finally, stay until we no longer need stay.
 
What happens after an area is cleared and you don't stay hold it? We've yet to learn this lesson in multiple wars.

These people can't protect themselves from extremists. It's like fighting cockroaches with a hammer.
Your question is very specific. Usually what happens is after our ground forces move out insurgents move in and take advantage of power vacuum. In Iraq what we needed and used was cooperative patrols with Iraqi governmental forces. However, that did not always happen and the Iraqi forces were not fully ready to take over the roll when the time came. The last Bush surge was working to get boots into all places, and was making progress, but when the administration changed the ultimate throw the Iraqis to wolves happened, and we pulled everything out. We didn't even leave a unit to hold a base. It was a very bad decision and one that allowed for insurgents to fill a very large void. There were lessons to be learned from the Iraq occupational period. The military is not very good at occupation. Never has been. Doesn't mean that they have to be bad just that they have very little experience in it. Now those lessons may be lost and after the blood spilled if this happens again we will be ill prepared yet again. I think this is a period in which it would be a good idea to have UN forces involved, but again in Iraq the UN never put up the troops to do this. Hope that answered your question.
 
It would be very expensive to maintain bases in the Middle east aside from what we have. The big sticking point with Iraq was the SOFA, we do not want our military personnel there without one which protects them........the comparison to Germany, japan and S. Korea is not valid........WWII was the last declared war the US was involved in and President Roosevelt in 1943 declared that we would except nothing short of unconditional surrender ( although we did allow Japan some conditions)....we maintain bases in S. Korea in order to deter N. Korea, and the fact that the Korean war is not officially over. ...........We do have access to bases in the Region in the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Diego Garcia and Turkey. Incirlik AB, near Adana Turkey is a huge base, around 100 hardened aircraft shelters and room for several hundred aircraft and support personnel, the biggest limitation is the Turkish Government
 
Did obama do everything he could do get the agreement signed? The alternate facts are that he couldn't do it or he wouldn't do it.
 
Who knows, that was the sticking point, but I think it is safe to say that no one on here really knows either way how much effort was put into renegotiating the SOFA
 
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