This link got buried in the other thread.
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/united-states-freezes-japanese-assets
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/united-states-freezes-japanese-assets
Did you know we made the first move against japan?
- Thread starter HighStickHarry
- Start date
Did the US deliberately provoke Japan to attack them or was it done unknowingly?
Benjamin Miller, M.A. History & Asian Studies, University of Chicago (2016)
This is a question I’ve heard from students a number of times, and the answer is yes and no. If you’ll indulge a lengthy post, I’ll explain.
The United States did provoke the Japanese attack, in the sense that it initiated on its own account diplomatic and economic pressure that the Japanese found increasingly intolerable, but it did not do so with the intention of starting war.
The Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, and became something of a quagmire for the Japanese - it sucked increasing amounts of money and men into it, costing tens of thousands of casualties, and taxing the Japanese economy heavily. As the Japanese couldn’t come to satisfactory terms with the Nationalist Government, and “peace without honor” wasn’t politically palatable, the Japanese were unable and unwilling to disengage.
The United States was immediately hostile to Japanese incursions into China - due in part because Japan’s aggression was perceived as a parallel to concurrent German aggression, and in part because the expansion of the Japanese sphere of influence in East Asia was incompatible with American interests - and imposed a series of escalating economic embargoes on Japan beginning in 1938. These embargoes were explicitly meant to curtail Japan’s willingness and capacity to prosecute the war against China.
Naturally, these embargoes were a source of increasing tension between Japan and the United States. In the first case, they impaired Japan’s import-dependent economy, and hampered its ability to supply its armed forces. Depending on the material in question, it imported something between 2/3 and 4/5 of its needed strategic material from the U.S. alone. In the second case, the embargoes were perceived by many in continuity with major American diplomatic breaches against Japan (1919 and 1924).
In 1940, the Japanese expanded the conflict by assuming control of a number of airfields in what is northern Vietnam (and by the end of the year would be in effective possession of French Indochina), which alarmed the Americans - it meant that they’d open another front against China, increasing the likelihood of victory, and that Japan’s strategic position was greatly enhanced at the expense of Euro-America. The U.S. responded with the Export Control Act of 1940, which suspended the export of important aviation fuel and equipment along with a variety of industrial minerals and chemicals to Japan. By fall of that year, the embargo was expanded to include steel and scrap metal. Petroleum was not included.
This is the important bit: from the American perspective, this was the escalation of diplomatic pressure in pursuit of its interests. From the Japanese, it was an existential threat, and induced something approaching quiet panic among the highest levels of Japanese government.
Should the embargoes have remained in place, or expanded, the Japanese would have burned through their strategic reserve, which in turn meant that their economy would have collapsed, and their capacity to support the half-million some odd troops in China would evaporate. So, in late 1940, the Japanese undertook a two-pronged approach, engaging in diplomatic negotiations to secure these essential resources on the one hand, and preparing to seize them by force on the other.
It’s important to understand that while Japan was not at all optimistic that its diplomatic efforts would be successful, both it and the United States undertook these negotiations in good faith. Though the Japanese were preparing for large-scale military operations, they were in fact prepared to disengage at a very late date, and the costs of the aborted operations would have been worth it to secure their supply lines through a diplomatic agreement. It’s difficult to overstate how much they really didn’t want to get into a war with the U.S.
The U.S., for its part, had a somewhat more complicated attitude toward the Japanese. While there were some in the Roosevelt administration who viewed war with Japan as desirable/necessary/inevitable, the practical necessity and political support for war weren’t taken fore-granted. And there is certainly no evidence (and quite a bit to the contrary) that the U.S. was attempting to goad the Japanese into a war at all, much less as a pretext for entering the war in Europe.
Despite mutual lack of interest in war, the fact of the matter was that the U.S. and Japan pursued mutually incompatible agendas, and approached these negotiations with little to no space for concessions. The Japanese didn’t appreciate the degree to which the War in Europe contextualized the American attitude toward the War in China, and assumed that the Americans would either give way, or have little stomach to fight. The Americans didn’t understand how intractable the Japanese position in China was, or how provocative their embargoes were, and the Roosevelt administration simply assumed, at least until late 1941, that the Japanese would back down. Relations between the U.S. and Japan steadily deteriorated throughout 1941 until the U.S. escalated their embargoes by suspending the export of petroleum to Japan. The British had also piled on their own embargoes by this point as well. That was pretty much the point of no return for Japan, and though negotiations continued through out November, the Americans had pretty much realized the the Japanese wouldn’t give, and that war was imminent.
Now, the question as to whether or not the U.S. provoked Japan is often asked as an extension of conspiracy theories that the Roosevelt administration required a pretext to join the war against Germany in the face of staunch isolationism. Such theories are absurd. Setting aside the fact that Germany’s declaration of war on the U.S. in honor of its alliance with Japan was hardly certain (removing the linchpin of such a plot), such theories are completely unsubstantiated.
The fact of the matter is that the Pacific War was the product of a prolonged period of deteriorating relations between the Great Powers, which itself was the result of longstanding and conflicting strategic interests. Japan was certainly the aggressor in the particular, but perceived its actions as a response to general U.S. provocations.
Benjamin Miller, M.A. History & Asian Studies, University of Chicago (2016)
This is a question I’ve heard from students a number of times, and the answer is yes and no. If you’ll indulge a lengthy post, I’ll explain.
The United States did provoke the Japanese attack, in the sense that it initiated on its own account diplomatic and economic pressure that the Japanese found increasingly intolerable, but it did not do so with the intention of starting war.
The Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, and became something of a quagmire for the Japanese - it sucked increasing amounts of money and men into it, costing tens of thousands of casualties, and taxing the Japanese economy heavily. As the Japanese couldn’t come to satisfactory terms with the Nationalist Government, and “peace without honor” wasn’t politically palatable, the Japanese were unable and unwilling to disengage.
The United States was immediately hostile to Japanese incursions into China - due in part because Japan’s aggression was perceived as a parallel to concurrent German aggression, and in part because the expansion of the Japanese sphere of influence in East Asia was incompatible with American interests - and imposed a series of escalating economic embargoes on Japan beginning in 1938. These embargoes were explicitly meant to curtail Japan’s willingness and capacity to prosecute the war against China.
Naturally, these embargoes were a source of increasing tension between Japan and the United States. In the first case, they impaired Japan’s import-dependent economy, and hampered its ability to supply its armed forces. Depending on the material in question, it imported something between 2/3 and 4/5 of its needed strategic material from the U.S. alone. In the second case, the embargoes were perceived by many in continuity with major American diplomatic breaches against Japan (1919 and 1924).
In 1940, the Japanese expanded the conflict by assuming control of a number of airfields in what is northern Vietnam (and by the end of the year would be in effective possession of French Indochina), which alarmed the Americans - it meant that they’d open another front against China, increasing the likelihood of victory, and that Japan’s strategic position was greatly enhanced at the expense of Euro-America. The U.S. responded with the Export Control Act of 1940, which suspended the export of important aviation fuel and equipment along with a variety of industrial minerals and chemicals to Japan. By fall of that year, the embargo was expanded to include steel and scrap metal. Petroleum was not included.
This is the important bit: from the American perspective, this was the escalation of diplomatic pressure in pursuit of its interests. From the Japanese, it was an existential threat, and induced something approaching quiet panic among the highest levels of Japanese government.
Should the embargoes have remained in place, or expanded, the Japanese would have burned through their strategic reserve, which in turn meant that their economy would have collapsed, and their capacity to support the half-million some odd troops in China would evaporate. So, in late 1940, the Japanese undertook a two-pronged approach, engaging in diplomatic negotiations to secure these essential resources on the one hand, and preparing to seize them by force on the other.
It’s important to understand that while Japan was not at all optimistic that its diplomatic efforts would be successful, both it and the United States undertook these negotiations in good faith. Though the Japanese were preparing for large-scale military operations, they were in fact prepared to disengage at a very late date, and the costs of the aborted operations would have been worth it to secure their supply lines through a diplomatic agreement. It’s difficult to overstate how much they really didn’t want to get into a war with the U.S.
The U.S., for its part, had a somewhat more complicated attitude toward the Japanese. While there were some in the Roosevelt administration who viewed war with Japan as desirable/necessary/inevitable, the practical necessity and political support for war weren’t taken fore-granted. And there is certainly no evidence (and quite a bit to the contrary) that the U.S. was attempting to goad the Japanese into a war at all, much less as a pretext for entering the war in Europe.
Despite mutual lack of interest in war, the fact of the matter was that the U.S. and Japan pursued mutually incompatible agendas, and approached these negotiations with little to no space for concessions. The Japanese didn’t appreciate the degree to which the War in Europe contextualized the American attitude toward the War in China, and assumed that the Americans would either give way, or have little stomach to fight. The Americans didn’t understand how intractable the Japanese position in China was, or how provocative their embargoes were, and the Roosevelt administration simply assumed, at least until late 1941, that the Japanese would back down. Relations between the U.S. and Japan steadily deteriorated throughout 1941 until the U.S. escalated their embargoes by suspending the export of petroleum to Japan. The British had also piled on their own embargoes by this point as well. That was pretty much the point of no return for Japan, and though negotiations continued through out November, the Americans had pretty much realized the the Japanese wouldn’t give, and that war was imminent.
Now, the question as to whether or not the U.S. provoked Japan is often asked as an extension of conspiracy theories that the Roosevelt administration required a pretext to join the war against Germany in the face of staunch isolationism. Such theories are absurd. Setting aside the fact that Germany’s declaration of war on the U.S. in honor of its alliance with Japan was hardly certain (removing the linchpin of such a plot), such theories are completely unsubstantiated.
The fact of the matter is that the Pacific War was the product of a prolonged period of deteriorating relations between the Great Powers, which itself was the result of longstanding and conflicting strategic interests. Japan was certainly the aggressor in the particular, but perceived its actions as a response to general U.S. provocations.
That is one of the best write ups on this subject I have read in while. I would agree with the conclusions as well. It becomes a series of cascading events in which both parties don't understand each other. Ironically it is now Japan we understand better and support and China now the party we don't understand and are at odds with.
The world was a crazy place back then.....as displayed by this link
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2039453/How-America-planned-destroy-BRITAIN-1930-bombing-raids-chemical-weapons.html
Also really surprise that the 1927 Navel Conference was not mentioned "In the treaty, the powers agreed to a 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 ratio of naval tonnage and restrictions with regard to new building of both ships and bases. This meant that while the United States and Great Britain remained on par with each other in the size of their navies, Japan was held to a navy 60 percent as large. France and Italy were restricted to navies 35 percent the size of the British and American forces."
The Japanese could have held off further military intervention/movements until negotiations were concluded with a more favorable outcome for them, but I seriously doubt that the militarist would have been satisfied. While I see the theme of the article as plausible just can't see how leveling fewer sanctions or negating sanctions already leveled would have changed the trajectory, especially since Japan could have secured most of the mineral needs they had, from China. Remember the world had just watched numerous concessions made to Germany only to have them blow up in their face. Heck Germany even coerced the Russians to sign a treaty that divided up a conquered Poland between the two, in 1939, only to come to a war between the two less than two years later.
My concern with these types of articles is that they start to soften up the image of what was Japan in the 20's, 30's and WWII. The Japanese were absolutely brutal in their treatment of anything not Japanese. Most of the general public, thanks to the deficit in public education regarding history, will start to see the Japanese as being goaded into war and if they were goaded into war then what the allies did to Japan during the war and especially dropping nuclear weapons was unjust. This is where the baseline on articles like this are headed IMHO.
Tulsaaggieson, agree with your summary on Japan vs China now. There were numerous diplomats and officers who knew that the Chinese were also useless, save Mao. Chaing Kai-Shek and his minions were absolutely crooked and dealing with them was a huge issue. Gen J Stillwell thought we should have cut them loose, which was a huge hit on his career with the Roosevelt administration.
Lastly, if you are going to attempt to justify sanctions and economic hardships as a reason to expand (don't forget The Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere which was the official Japanese approach to governing conquered Asian populations from 1930-1945) then the next article that needs to be written is how/why The Treaty of Versailles guaranteed that there would be another European conflict. So it could be surmised that Germany was also goaded into war by the western powers over a treaty that was unjustly harsh and more of a tool for revenge and theft then a treaty to ensure future wars would be avoided.
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2039453/How-America-planned-destroy-BRITAIN-1930-bombing-raids-chemical-weapons.html
Also really surprise that the 1927 Navel Conference was not mentioned "In the treaty, the powers agreed to a 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 ratio of naval tonnage and restrictions with regard to new building of both ships and bases. This meant that while the United States and Great Britain remained on par with each other in the size of their navies, Japan was held to a navy 60 percent as large. France and Italy were restricted to navies 35 percent the size of the British and American forces."
The Japanese could have held off further military intervention/movements until negotiations were concluded with a more favorable outcome for them, but I seriously doubt that the militarist would have been satisfied. While I see the theme of the article as plausible just can't see how leveling fewer sanctions or negating sanctions already leveled would have changed the trajectory, especially since Japan could have secured most of the mineral needs they had, from China. Remember the world had just watched numerous concessions made to Germany only to have them blow up in their face. Heck Germany even coerced the Russians to sign a treaty that divided up a conquered Poland between the two, in 1939, only to come to a war between the two less than two years later.
My concern with these types of articles is that they start to soften up the image of what was Japan in the 20's, 30's and WWII. The Japanese were absolutely brutal in their treatment of anything not Japanese. Most of the general public, thanks to the deficit in public education regarding history, will start to see the Japanese as being goaded into war and if they were goaded into war then what the allies did to Japan during the war and especially dropping nuclear weapons was unjust. This is where the baseline on articles like this are headed IMHO.
Tulsaaggieson, agree with your summary on Japan vs China now. There were numerous diplomats and officers who knew that the Chinese were also useless, save Mao. Chaing Kai-Shek and his minions were absolutely crooked and dealing with them was a huge issue. Gen J Stillwell thought we should have cut them loose, which was a huge hit on his career with the Roosevelt administration.
Lastly, if you are going to attempt to justify sanctions and economic hardships as a reason to expand (don't forget The Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere which was the official Japanese approach to governing conquered Asian populations from 1930-1945) then the next article that needs to be written is how/why The Treaty of Versailles guaranteed that there would be another European conflict. So it could be surmised that Germany was also goaded into war by the western powers over a treaty that was unjustly harsh and more of a tool for revenge and theft then a treaty to ensure future wars would be avoided.
what a monday morning quarterback pile of intellectual dog feces
sanitized version of historical events driving an agenda that provides no account for the demonic animal that was the WW2 era imperial japanese military
start with the rape of nanking so you have some semblance of emotional understanding of the times
then read this drivel
i hadn’t read your reply while formulating my response
agree with your thoughts and heartened to see others see the original article for what it is
This view counters the view some on here believe the US initiated the war on Japan. My dad fought in the Phillipines, when I was really young my dad would say do not make me hang you by your ears. No other parents said that, I was adopted when my dad was 43, he was really old compared to other fathers. The one night he agreed to talk to me about the war he told me that they cut off supplies to the Island and the Japanese resorted to hanging US soldiers alive by their ears and carving them up and eating them alive. My dad told me one day he ran across 3 Jap soldiers that hung a soldier and was eating a US soldier. He killed the Japs, he said the person was so carved up it took him awhile to realize it was his best friend. He said he was an awful shape and was dying and nothing anyone could do, his friend asked him to shoot him and my dad did. The Philippines was brutal fighting and the Japs were ruthless murderers.
Go read the thread Proud of My President, seems we have US citizens that believe our country is full of war mongering murdering war criminals. Frankly, if they really believe this, why not move? Why be complicit as a citizen and continue to support the military with your tax dollars if you feel this way? Would that not be the moral thing to do if you are going to go all moral and conspiracy theory on the war and ignore what actually happened?
Maybe a sanitized version might help inform. The question asked did not ask the respondent to address the horrific brutality of Jap soldiers.
No need to preach to me because I know a ton of gruesome details about that war most do not, the Jap people thought their emperor was a deity to the point Jap pilots would have their funeral before boarding a plane and dive bomb and die, and if they returned alive they would be shot. Jap civilian population thought the emperor was a deity and could no wrong.
I am against war, but dropping the bombs on Japan was morally justified by the actions of our enemy, and the fact it saved 400,000 to 800,000 US soldiers lives from the invasion and 5 million to 10 million Jap lives.
Anyone remember the Bataan death march?
In this politically correct world it is not cool to talk about a Jap fighting machine that ignored all civility in its behavior, relished dying for the Emperor, and tortured people.
His answer framed the political issues of WW2 only.
I am fully aware of the brutality of the Imperial Japanese army.
My conscience has no problem with dropping those bombs on Japan.
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